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1. Introduction: The US Leading Role in World Politics  
 
The attempts of states to acquire and retain powerful and dominant positions in world politics 
have contributed to shape and influence our understanding of international relations. The 
refusal of states to accept the dominant position of another country results in active attempts 
to undermine powerful states’ dominant positions and potential creation of international 
conflicts. The Cold War era offers an ideal example for the refusal and resistance to accept 
that another state is dominant in world politics. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War—
where the United States (US) emerged as the sole winner and hence most powerful state—this 
concept of undermining the power of a global-dominant state has been on the decline. The 
international legitimacy of the US as a global player is hardly undermined and has been 
relatively widely accepted by the international community.1 From the United States’ presence 
in the Middle East to the numerous amounts of US military bases in Germany, the United 
States’ influence in the international and global community is significantly dominant. Since 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US has emerged as a global superpower with enormous 
global influence.2 The phenomenon of the dollarization is growing with more than seven 
independent countries using the dollar as legal tender. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay 
observed in 2003 that the phrase “American empire” has appeared more than 1.000 times in 
the news in the span of just six months. How can one explain this clear dominance in an 
anarchic international system, where every state tries to balance the power of the other? Why 
does the international community give the US the capacity and—most importantly—the 
legitimacy and authority to be as influential and dominant as it is nowadays? 
After the launch of the Iraq war—where the US went to war without a legal basis—the US’ 
long-held obligation to comply with international law has been undermined and with it its 
international legitimacy and authority. The US, as internationally powerful and dominant as 
ever, has lost a degree of its international legitimacy. This brings the sources and reasons for 
international legitimacy and authority into questions. If legitimacy and authority do not derive 
from power and capabilities, where else do they come from?  David A. Lake argues in his 
book Hierarchy in International Relations that we have actually been looking at world 
politics all wrong. He disagrees with the classical international relations theories that assume 
that the international community is anarchic in its nature by arguing that relations between 
																																																								
1 It is clear to me that not all states accept the legitimacy of the US, for instance North Korea, Iran, and Russia.  
However, for the most part the US represents a dominant global power.  
2 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 2014. 
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states vary on a continuum between complete anarchy and complete hierarchy. At the level of 
pure hierarchy a subordinate state gives up all of its sovereignty to a dominant state and 
receives political order—inter alia international security—from it in exchange. While it makes 
sense that a dominant state will want to have authority over others and with it authority in the 
international system, it is not logical for a state to subordinate and submit itself to the 
authority of another state. So what incentives do states have to engage in such a hierarchal 
relationship and what do they get in return? This theory, developed in 2009, is extremely 
relevant and unique in its nature because it can explain international phenomena that the 
classical international relations theories fail to explain due to the anarchy assumption. The 
theory is extremely helpful in trying to understand the international influence and dominance 
of the United States. Looking at the United Nations (UN), how can one explain the permanent 
presence of only five countries in the Security Council? If the international system was in fact 
anarchic and all states were equal in rights—or lack of rights, why is the power of veto 
wielded solely by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (US, 
Russia, France, UK and China) and deprived from others?  
Although Lake analyzes the effect such a hierarchy has on the involved states, all of his 
research was focused on correlations and causal mechanisms on the macro-level and lacked 
explanatory depth when it comes to the affected states themselves. Lake, as the fist advocator 
of voluntary hierarchal relationships in the international community, only focused on 
quantitative studies, proving that hierarchy in the international system does in fact matter. 
Therefore, I believe that my thesis is relevant and additive to an important debate concerning 
the fundamentals of international relations, as I analyze the effect of hierarchy on a small 
number of states not only to understand if hierarchy affects the behavior of states but most 
importantly how it does so. I focus on the motivation and incentives of the subordinate state, 
as it is logical—and proven by international relations scholars—that states strive to have a 
dominant position and to exert power and authority over other states. However, it is not so 
clear why a state would willingly subordinate itself to the authority of another state.  
Hence, my research question is:  
 
How does hierarchy in international relations influence the behavior of the subordinate 
state? 
 
In the next section, I will provide a literature synopsis explaining how international relations 
theorists think of anarchy and hierarchy in the international system and the relevant scientific 
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work contributing to the debate. Afterwards, I will explain Lake’s theory of Hierarchy in 
International Relations in full details and offer conceptualizations of the terms that will be 
used later in this thesis. After doing so, I will develop theoretical expectations on how 
hierarchy in the international system influences the subordinate state. After specifying my 
theoretical expectations, I will test them on three case studies: Japan, Ecuador, and Bahrain, 
which are selected based on the kind of hierarchy with the US they are embedded in. Japan is 
in a security hierarchy, Ecuador in an economic hierarchy, while Bahrain is in both 
hierarchies with the US. By choosing the case studies based on the type of hierarchy, I will be 
able to account for the effects of the different kinds of hierarchy. Does economic hierarchy 
have a significant influence on the behavior of the subordinate state? Does security hierarchy 
have a higher impact? Is the presence of both economic and security hierarchies a prerequisite 
for a significant impact on the behavior of the subordinate state?  
2. Anarchy to Hierarchy 
 
The international system consists of co-existing sovereign states that possess autonomy over 
their policies and decisions. This concept gained relevance after the treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, which placed sovereignty at the core of modern international law. This implies that 
each state has sovereignty and complete autonomy over its domestic and foreign affairs. In 
theory, this doctrine prevents all external powers from intervening in another state’s affairs. 
Consequently, every state—regardless of its power or size—is deemed an equal member of 
the international community.3 As the international system is theoretically composed of 
sovereign and independent states, it is, ergo, not regulated by a higher power. Therefore, 
every state is free to act independently without limitations and restrictions. Realist theorists 
assume that the international system is anarchic. This characteristic heavily influences the 
states’ decision-making process and foreign policies. This doctrine is derived from the 
Hobbesian state of nature—where men are equal, interact in anarchy, and are driven by 
competition, diffidence and glory.4 This state leads to socio-political conditions whereby a 
war of “every man against every man” prevails, highlighting the necessity of self-help. 5 
When equal actors interact in anarchy or in the “state of nature” with the absence of a 
regulator, violence and more anarchy would be the outcome. Thus, Thomas Hobbes explained 
																																																								
3 Kissinger 2014. 
4 Hobbes 1996: 86. 
5 Ibid 62.  
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the emergence of the state or the “Leviathan” as an attempt to escape the anarchic state of 
nature. The individuals subordinate themselves to a sovereign by giving up a degree of their 
freedom in exchange for political order. Hobbes sees this as the only way to escape the nature 
of the systematic anarchy. Political theorists succeeding Hobbes, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
and John Locke, took his assumptions as given and did not differ in the conception of the 
state of nature as anarchic. Thus, nearly all realism theorists assumed that the international 
environment is anarchic in nature and lacks centralized authority. Kenneth N. Waltz further 
develops this doctrine by arguing that structural anarchic orders do not have functional 
differentiation. In other words, the only differences between states “are of capability, not 
function”.6 This implies that there are no super- and subordinate states, only equal states that 
differ in their capabilities. This leads to the so called “security dilemma” that pervades 
relations between all states. 7 As John Herz stated: 
 
“Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, 
concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or 
annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such 
attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact 
of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels 
them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world 
of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and 
power accumulation is on.” 8 
 
The central argument in structural realism is that states in anarchy, which assumingly prevails 
in the international community, balance powers rather than bandwagon.9 That would be 
contrary to a hierarchal international political order, where states bandwagon powerful states 
because it is relatively safer than balancing the power. Anarchy is also important to neoliberal 
institutionalism, which is premised on structural and systematic anarchy being the foundation 
of the international system. However, neo-liberal institutional theorists, like Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, argue that international institutions can constrain the anarchic behavior of 
states and encourage cooperation even if the international system lacks a central political 
authority or government. While anarchy is central to positivism, constructivism is developed 
on the premise that the dominant features of international relations are socially and 
historically constructed—including the concept of anarchy.  In Anarchy is what states make of 
																																																								
6 Waltz 1979: 96. 
7 Herz 1950: 157. 
8 Herz 1950: 60. 
9 Waltz 1979: 126. 
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it,10 Alexander Wendt advances the concept that anarchy is socially constructed by the actors 
in the international system and that it is a result of the social interactions between states, 
rather than a structural and systematic characteristic of the international system that is 
inescapable.  
 
Although most scholars assume that anarchy exists in international relations, there have 
always been hierarchal relationships in the international system, including empires, colonies, 
and dependencies. Classical international relations theories can only explain such 
relationships, if the political actors subordinated were conquered (by the dominant) or were 
forced by coercion to undergo such a relationship, which in turn would be a violation of state 
sovereignty.  However, they cannot explain cases where states agree to give up a certain 
degree of their sovereignty to another state or to an international institution, nor can they 
explain cases for instance, where a state has a higher power or authority over other states—for 
example the members of the UN Security Council. There have always been states that 
subordinate themselves—to a certain extent and in certain fields—to the authority of another 
state or more commonly to an international institution. The Cold War era provides several 
appropriate examples for international hierarchal relationships. During the Cold War, both the 
Soviet Union and the US had states depending and relying on them for economic and security 
purposes. Also in modern international politics, the US has maintained international 
hierarchies in Western Europe and more recently in the Persian Gulf.  
Most international relations theorists—following Kenneth Waltz—assume that hierarchy and 
anarchy are dichotomous political orders. Jack Donnelly argues that this is a conceptual error 
and obscures ours understanding of the international system. He claims that one should think 
of  “hierarchy in anarchy”11 rather than the dichotomous distinction of either hierarchy or 
anarchy. Donnelly argues that the concepts of hierarchy in anarchy and sovereign inequality 
are essential for comprehending the contemporary world order. Daniel H. Deudney, Max 
Weber, and David A. Lake all agree that the absence of a formal global government does not 
preclude the informal formation of hierarchal structures.12 John M. Hobson and J.C. Sharman 
argue that hierarchal sub-systems have existed since 1648 after the emergence of the 
Westphalian sovereignty and that the international system continues to include hierarchal as 
																																																								
10 Wendt 2007. 
11 Donnelly 2006: 139. 
12 Deudney 2007; Lake 2009; Weber 1997. 
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well as anarchic relations.13 Nico Kirsch contributes to the international hierarchy debate by 
analyzing the ways in which dominant states interact with the international law.14 Jack 
Donnelly takes American international power as given and addresses the question whether the 
US is in fact an empire or an empire in the making.15 Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright 
observe the American empire debate, concluding that the imperial powers of the US have 
decreased since the end of the Cold War.16 
3.  Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Hierarchy in International Relations—Basic Assumptions  
 
Lake views the international community and how it behaves in a different way than the 
classical international relation theorists do. First, he challenges the prevailing formal-legal 
view—which says that power and authority stem from a lawful position—and argues from a 
relational view of authority. This relational concept implies that “the right to rule rests on a 
social contract in which the ruler provides a political order of value to the ruled, who in turn 
grant legitimacy to the ruler and comply with the restraints on their behavior necessary for the 
production of that order”.17 This is equivalent to Hobbes’ domestic concept of the emergence 
of the Leviathan—as a social construct—and the escape from the state of nature.  
Second, he assumes that sovereignty consists of a “bundle of rights or authorities that can be 
divided among different levels of governance and different rulers”18. Therefore, certain policy 
fields can be restricted to the authority of the state, but other policy fields can be transferred to 
a foreign state or an international institution. In short, Lake argues that sovereignty is 
divisible. Treating sovereignty as a divisible variable allows us to understand and analyze 




13 Hobson and Sharman 2005. 
14 Kirsch 2005. 
15 Donnelly 2006. 
16 Nexon and Wright 2007. 
17 Lake 2009: 3. 
18 Ibid. 
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3.2 Conceptualizations  
 
Political Authority 
The difference between authority and other forms of power is the mechanism by which the 
ruler makes the ruled comply with his commands. Power in this theory is not exercised 
though coercion, force, or threat but with legitimacy and conviction that the ruler’s commands 
are legitimate and should be complied with. The distinction between authority and coercion is 
clear in theory, however the empirical distinction can be very ambivalent. State A can comply 
with state B’s command out of coercion and out of authority. While the outcome is the same, 
the motivation behind the action differs. One cannot directly rationalize the reason behind 
state B’s action, but by analyzing the relationship between both states, one can make a 
legitimate assumption about the nature of the action and the motivation behind it. Authority 
simply means rightful rule, suggesting that an authoritative ruler has the right to rule and 
command subordinates, who in turn have a duty to comply with the ruler’s commands 
because they view the commands as lawful and legitimate. 19 Thus, authority is a legitimate 
power over others. This implies that the authority of the ruler has to be accepted and 
legitimized by the subordinates, suggesting that authority is a right granted by the ruled—not 
a claim made by the ruler. 
Legitimacy—the right to rule—can be derived from many sources, most commonly formal-
legal rules. According to Max Weber’s legal authority, the formal-legal authority is the 
dominant approach in international relations. In this approach the ruler’s ability to rule and 
the willingness of the ruled to comply derives from the office or lawful position that the ruler 
holds. This approach precludes any possibility of authority between states due to the lack of 
lawful positions in the international system. However, according to David Lake, there is 
another conception of authority, where legitimacy does not necessarily derive from the office 
of the ruler, but from a bargain or contract between the ruler and the ruled. Relational 
authority relies on the contract between the ruler and the ruled. The ruler provides a political 
order to the ruled as compensation for the loss of freedom resulting from its subordination to 
the ruler. The ruled acknowledges the ruler’s right to restrain its behavior in order to provide 
the political order. The relational authority between the dominant and the subordinate is in 
form of a self-enforcing contract. This implies that the outcome of the contract is what 
incentivizes the parties to engage (or keep engaging) in the social contract. This suggests that 
																																																								
19 Lake 2010. 
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when the costs of the contract are higher than the benefits, the contract will not be renewed. 
Thus, both the ruler and the ruled have to be better off with the contract. 
 
Political order  
According to Hedley Bull, a political order is “a pattern of human activities that sustain 
elementary, primary, or universal goals of social life”.20 In short, one can conceptualize 
political order as “the protection of persons, property, and promises.”21 For the purpose of this 
research, I consider political order to mean all the benefits that a subordinate state gets from 
being in a hierarchal relationship.  
 
Social Contract  
As hierarchy is a voluntary act that the subordinate and the dominant state choose to partake, 
the benefits of such a contract must at least cover the costs of it.  
Figure 1 illustrates the costs benefit analysis of undergoing such a contract for the subordinate 
state.  
 
Figure 1: The Subordintate State’s Costs and Benefits of the Social Contract.22 
 
																																																								
20 Bull 1977: 5. 
21 Lake 2009: 8. 
22 Source: Own Illustration. 
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The x-axis depicts the degree of subordination to a dominant state, while the y-axis illustrates 
the benefits of subordination: political order.  The y-intercept is higher than zero because 
every country has a minimum degree of political order and political structure that exists in the 
original state. Thus, it would be naïve to assume that the line originates from zero. The degree 
of political order increases with an increase in the degree of subordination. Subordination can 
be equivalent to zero, suggesting that there is no hierarchal relationship between the state-
dyad. Thus, subordination—or hierarchy—is a continuous variable ranging from complete 
sovereignty to complete subordination.  
This figure depicts the subordinate’s costs and benefits of engaging in an international 
hierarchy. The linear function splits the area in two parts: the white area above the function 
and the grey area underneath it. The white area depicts the benefits of subordinating and 
submitting to a dominant state that guarantees political order. The grey area represents the 
costs of subornation: the loss of sovereignty. A state will engage in a hierarchal contract, 
where it gives up a degree of its autonomy in exchange for political order, only if the gains of 
subordination (political order) are higher than the costs (loss of sovereignty). Consequently, 
the social contract will be constructed in a way that benefits both the dominant and the 
subordinate state. Both states have to be better off. It might be profit-maximizing for one state 
to give up all its sovereignty in exchange for political order, but another state might only need 
a small degree of “assistance” and ergo will only transfer a small amount of autonomy to the 
dominant state. Thus, every state dyad generates a different cost-benefit function, resulting in 
a different degree of hierarchal relationship. As Lake stated:  
 
“Hierarchy exists when one actor, the ruler, or A [...], possesses authority over a 
second actor, the ruled, or B, defined as a collective of individuals. Authority is never 
total, of course, but varies in extent. It may be that A possesses authority over B and 
issues commands regulating possible actions 1-5 but not on actions 6-n, which remain 






23 Lake 2009: 51. 
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3.3 Independent Variable: International Hierarchy  
 
Following the idea that sovereignty is divisible, Lake disaggregates hierarchy in two broad 
policy areas: economic and security hierarchy.  
 
Security Hierarchy 
According to Lake, security policy consists of all diplomatic, military, and economic actions 
disposable to a country to lower the risk and effectiveness of coercion from external actors.24 
Security hierarchy relationships range from diplomacy to protectorates.25 In the case of the 
Westphalian sovereignty, states interact in a diplomatic manner while having complete 
authority and autonomy over their actions. In the case of a protectorate, state A (dominant) 
has authority over many or all of state B’s security policy (subordinate). As hierarchy is a 
continuous variable, there exists an intermediate form (a weak protectorate), suggesting that 
state A exercises limited or controlled authority over the foreign and defense policies of state 
B.   
 
Economic Hierarchy  
Economic policy, according to Lake, includes all actions that influence the allocation and 
accumulation of resources. This includes creating and enforcing property rights, monetary 
system, macroeconomic management, regulation etc. Economic relationships between states 
range from market exchange—the Westphalian ideal—to economic dependency. In the 
Westphalian ideal states trade, invest, and interact in economic relationships while preserving 
full authority over their policies. At the other end of the continuum—economic dependency—
a state transfers authority over all of its economic policies and decisions to another. The 
intermediate form of economic hierarchy is a weak economic dependency, where the 
subordinate state transfers some authority over its external economic relations and domestic 
economic policies to the dominant state. An example for a weak dependency would include 
fixing the rate of the subordinate’s currency to the dominant’s currency, transferring some 
authority over monetary policy to the dominant state.  
 
																																																								
24 Lake 2009: 52. 
25 Ibid. 
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After having the theoretical construct of hierarchal relationship between states, I will illustrate 
how one can identify such a hierarchal relationship in the international system. To do so, I 
will first operationalize and measure economic and security hierarchy by using Lake’s 
indicators and adding my own indicators. 
 
Indicators of Security Hierarchy  
Lake measures security hierarchy using two indicators: presence of military forces of the 
dominant state on the territory of the subordinate state and the number of independent—from 
the dominant—alliances possessed by the subordinate.  
The presence of military forces of a foreign state on the territory of a sovereign state suggests 
a hierarchal relationship, ergo a state’s authority over another state. Foreign military troops on 
the territory of a sovereign state allow foreign influence on the security policies of said state. 
If state A has military forces deployed on the territory of state B, then it would be possible 
that state A launches attacks from the territory of state B, consequently involving state B in an 
international conflict. The larger the military deployment in state B, the more control A has 
over B, thus the more hierarchal the security relationship is likely to be.  
Having only allies that are also associated with the dominant state can suggest a hierarchal 
relationship. Lake defines independent alliance as the number of alliances that the other 
party—in the hierarchal relationship—is not a part of. This implies that state B has other 
allies that could help reduce the influence of state A, if state B decides to break the hierarchal 
relationship. Hence, state B is not completely dependent on state A but has other options for 
security assistance. The lower the number of independent alliances, the more hierarchal the 
security relationship is likely to be. This is a less direct indicator for security hierarchy than 
foreign military deployment. However, if a state is aware that it does not have independent 
alliances and chooses not to change the status quo, this could be interpreted as an acceptance 
of the hierarchal relationship.  
 
Indicators of Economic Hierarchy  
Lake captures economic hierarchy using two indicators: monetary policy autonomy and trade 
dependency. I will add to these indicators a third one: foreign aid.  
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Monetary policy, particularly the exchange rate regime, can be an indicator of economic 
dependency. 26  How the national currency is set relative to the value of foreign currencies is 
significant when it comes to measuring economic dependency. A flexible exchange rate 
means that the monetary policy of a country is completely independent from any foreign 
currency. This means that the exchange rate is determined by the supply and demand of the 
currency (relative to another currency) in the financial market. Such an exchange rate implies 
no economic hierarchy. An exchange rate can also be fixed to another currency—nowadays 
most commonly the US dollar.  By doing so, the fixed currency indirectly adopts the 
monetary policy of the country whose currency it is pegged to. If state B fixes its currency 
(currency B) to the currency of state A (currency A), this would imply that if the exchange 
rate of currency A falls, the exchange rate of currency B will consequently fall. Thus, 
domestic monetary policies in the dominant state influence state B’s monetary policies and 
exchange rate, even if this influence is unwanted or unintended by state A. At an extreme 
form, a country can adopt the currency of a foreign state as its own, suggesting that the 
foreign currency is the legal tender.  This process is known as dollarization. In this case, the 
country directly imports the monetary policy of a foreign country, suggesting that the money 
supply does not depend on the country’s monetary policy decisions but on the foreign 
country’s monetary policy. Thus, the more dependent the monetary policy of one state is on 
another state, the more hierarchal the relationship between both states is likely to be.  
According to Lake, the second indicator of economic hierarchy is trade dependency. If a 
country has many trade partners, it is more likely to have greater political autonomy, 
suggesting that any attempt to manipulate trade for other purposes or goals will not be 
effective. It is clear that trade partners are not directly chosen by the government, but by firms 
and micro-level economic actors. Nevertheless, if a government fails to diversify its trade 
partners, then it indirectly accepts the hierarchal order. Lake measures relative trade 
dependency as each country’s total trade with the dominant state divided by its own GDP, 
minus similar ratios for the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
(China, Great Britain, France, and Russia, and US). Countries that trade with the US more 
than with all the other P5 states combined are relatively trade dependent, and countries that 
trade more with the other P5 states than with the US are relatively independent.  
I argue that Lake’s operationalization of trade dependency is too complex to measure 
economic hierarchy. It’s irrelevant if state B trades more with the US than it does with Russia. 
																																																								
26 Monetary policy is the process by which the central bank of a country controls the money supply, often 
pursuing a certain inflation rate, interest rate, or exchange rate.  
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I argue that the relevant and significant question is: how much of the total trade is with just 
one country? How dependent is a state’s economy on one trading partner? Thus, I measure 
trade dependency by looking at the trade with the dominant state as a percentage of the total 
trade. This simple measurement allows us to analyze whether a country’s trade depends on 
one state more than all other trading partners. If 50% of a country’s trade were with just one 
country, then this country would obviously be dependent on this trade partner—and vice 
versa.  
I suggest that adding a third indicator of economic dependency, which is foreign aid, will 
result in a better measurement of economic hierarchy. 27 Foreign aid is the international 
transfer of capital, services, or goods from a national country or international organization to 
support the economy or political order of the receiving country. Foreign aid can be provided 
in the form of economic, military, development, or emergency humanitarian aid. For the 
purpose of this research, I only look at foreign aid where the donor is a national 
government—as opposed to foreign aid from international organizations like the UN—and I 
will treat development and foreign aid as equal phenomena. Simply put, I completely 
disregard the incentives and motives behind the act of assistance—whether it is for 
development purposes or financial assistance. When a state “aids” another state, it 
instinctively puts itself in a dominant position. Thus, one can assume that the dominant state 
gives foreign aid to its subordinates. For this reason, one can consider foreign aid as an 
indicator of international hierarchy, where the dominant state is the donor and the subordinate 
state the recipient.  
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development classifies aid in three categories: Official development assistance 
(ODA), official aid (OD), or other official flows (OOF). ODA is given to a developing 
country either as a grant—where no repayment is required—or as concessional loans, where 
the interest rate is lower than the rate in the market. OD is defined as development aid 
provided to industrialized countries. OOF is considered as a different form of aid that does 
not fall into the former categories, either because its goal is not development or it is 
considered a normal international loan. The later could be because the interest rate is not 
significantly lower than that in the market.  
Having specified my independent variables and their indicators, I will now analyze the 
dependent variables and their operationalization.  
																																																								
27 Foreign aid may also be known as development assistance, international aid, overseas aid, or official 
development assistance (ODA).  
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3.4 Dependent Variable: Behavior of The Subordinate State  
 
Hierarchy affects the behavior and policies of subordinate states in many ways. Behavioral 
change is a natural consequence of subordination to external authority. But how exactly does 
being in an international hierarchal relationship affect the subordinate state? Lake detects 
three behavioral changes in the subordinate state. I will explain those changes and develop my 
own theoretical expectations that complement and add to Lake’s findings.   
 
Subordination and Perception of Security 
The subordinate state gives up a degree of its sovereignty to the dominant state in exchange 
for political order, which is comprised of valued services provided by the dominant state. This 
political order that the dominant state provides includes a degree of security that is greater 
than the security the dominant state would achieve without the international contract. This is 
because the dominant state offers protection and effective technologies that the subordinate 
state would not acquire without the external help or would acquire but less efficiently. This 
means that the subordinate can achieve a higher degree of security more efficiently and with 
fewer costs. These spared resources can be implemented and used in other valued policies, 
like economic growth and education. Thus, security hierarchy reduces the defense efforts in 
the subordinate state, as it—to a certain extent depending on the degree of the hierarchal 
relationship—depends on the dominant for protection and security. Having received 
protection from the dominant state, the subordinate can divert the remaining resources to 
other valued uses.  
 
H1: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the less effort the subordinate state will 
invest in defense.  
Operationalization: I use Lake’s operationalization of defense efforts as military expenditures 
as a share of GDP.  
While Lake’s operationalization captures the defense efforts of the subordinate state, it does 
not measure the actual consequence of the international hierarchal order—which is actual 
security. Does the security of the subordinate state actually increase? While it might be true 
that the defense efforts decrease, this only implies that the perception of security of the state 
increases, not the actual security. One would have to actually investigate if the dominant state 
does protect and help the subordinate state in the event of an international conflict. Therefore, 
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I develop another hypothesis—that compliments, not substitutes, Lake’s hypothesis—by 
arguing that the dominant state aids the subordinate state in the event of international conflict.  
 
H2: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the dominant state will aid 
the subordinate state in an international conflict.  
Operationalization: Here I look at the international conflicts that the subordinate state was 
involved in and investigate whether the dominant state formally aided the subordinate.  
 
 Subordination and Compliance  
In exchange for the benefits of the social contract, subordinates empower the dominant state 
by accepting and legitimizing its authority and this usually entails compliance. Therefore, 
complying with an external actor and respecting its authority suggest that the subordinate 
state will alter its behavior compared to its behavior under complete sovereignty. However, 
the outcome of compliance under authority is the same as compliance under coercion. 
Measuring the reasons behind compliance, involves private information that is very difficult 
to acquire.28 For the sake of this research, I will ignore the private information regarding the 
true incentives behind the subordinate’s compliance. I will assume that compliance between a 
subordinate and a dominant state is always a result of authority and legitimacy, not coercion.  
 
H3: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
comply with the dominant state.   
Operationalization: In this thesis, I only consider compliance in international organizations 
and institutions. I look at the voting behavior in international bodies and how the subordinate 
state behaves given the behavior of the dominant state. Does the subordinate state follow the 
lead of the dominant state by voting in the same manner?   
 
Nevertheless, compliance is not the only way by which a subordinate declares the acceptance 
and legitimacy of the dominant’s authority. Subordinates can also express respect for 
authority by what Lake calls “symbolic obeisance”.29 Symbolic obeisance is an act that does 
not entail direct compliance with commands but are public collective shows of submission. 
These acts acknowledge and reinforce the authority of the ruler. By displaying acts of 
obeisance, the ruler’s authority gets reaffirmed and reinforced because it is a sign that the 
																																																								
28 Assessing private information, like incentives or secret negotiations, is difficult but not impossible.  
29 Lake 2009: 165. 
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subordinate state respects the authority of the subordinate and this signals authority and 
legitimacy of the dominant state to the other subordinates and to the international community. 
Thus, the role and position of the dominant state gets strengthened even though the act was 
entirely symbolic and not tangibly beneficial. Symbolic obeisance in international relations 
can be in form of visiting a newly elected head of state right after they assume their position, 
or having the headquarters of an international institution in the dominant state as an 
expression of their legitimacy.30  
Symbolic obeisance is demonstrated clearly in the probability that a subordinate state follows 
its dominant in an international conflict or war. This is equivalent to people joining the 
military as an act of patriotism, for instance after 9/11 in the US many young American 
voluntarily enlisted themselves. In international relations, following a state into wars and 
international conflicts is a costly act. However, a subordinate state can declare its support for 
the dominant state in an international conflict. Subordinate states may not contribute any 
resources or efforts, but their obeisance with the dominant state is a clear act of subordination 
and acknowledgement of legitimacy and authority. Thus, Lake argues that:  
 
H4: The higher the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
join international conflicts that the dominant state is involved it.  
Operationalization: Here I will look at the international conflicts the dominant state was 
involved in and whether the subordinate state joined the conflict or not.  
 
Subordination and Economic Openness  
International factor movements are movements of labor, capital, factors of production, and 
goods. The flow occurs in many ways: migration, capital transfers through borrowing and 
lending, foreign direct investments, and trade. National governments usually regulate 
immigration, capital flows, trade, and foreign direct investments. The regulation of 
international movement is due to the fact that not all countries share the same political orders 
and, thus, rules. Countries and private investors do not want to bear the risk of unsecured or 
risky commerce and investments. Therefore, investment, trade, and human capital flow are 
only significant in countries that can guarantee a certain degree of order, insurance, and 
property rights. Developed states may also regulate and restrict capital and human capital 
flow in certain risky countries, avoiding potential sovereignty theft that might lead to official 
																																																								
30 The United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank for instance are headquartered in the 
US. This may be interpreted as an acceptance that the US leads the international organization.  
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protection and diplomatic or military intervention. Without a minimum degree of political 
order actors will simply not take the risk of investing or trading internationally. Property 
rights have to be defined and properly enforced so the risk of the investment does not 
outweigh its return.31 
Subordinate states enjoy a degree of political order where the dominant state protects their 
goods and their contracts. This signals international investors, trading partners, and 
international organization that the property rights will be defined and enforced and that the 
political order is secure. This in turn incentivizes more trade and investments that would 
otherwise not occur due to uncertainty and risk aversion of the trading partners and investors. 
Being a subordinate to a well-established, successful, and liberal dominant state indicates that 
the dominant state will protect the rights, contracts, investments, goods, and human capital in 
the subordinate country.  
 
H5: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely trade will constitute a high 
share of the GDP of the subordinate state.   
Operationalization: Lake defines trade openness as a country’s total trade (imports and 
exports) with all partners as a share of its GDP.  
 
H6: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely foreign investments will be 
made in the subordinate state.   
Operationalization: Here I measure foreign investments using foreign direct investments 
(FDI), which include all capital contributions where an investor obtains a lasting interest in an 
enterprise in a foreign country.  
 
Lake’s conclusion that subordination leads to trade openness relies on different assumptions 
than the ones I explained. He argues that the political order that the dominant state ensures 
incentivizes the subordinate state to open its economy. This implies that trade openness is a 
result of the subordinate state’s decision, not a result of market allocation and the profit 
maximization of the investors. In this research, however, I argue that trade openness is a result 
of the market allocation and the rationality of the economic actors in the international system 
that choose to cooperate, trade, and invest in the subordinate state.  
 
																																																								
31 In economics, property rights are a socially enforced construct for determining how a resource or good is used 
and owned.  
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Subordination and Risk Aversion  
A state that undergoes an international social contract with a powerful dominant state enjoys a 
high degree of protection and security. This is due to the nature of the social contract, where 
the subordinate state gives up a degree of its sovereignty in exchange for political order—
inter alia protection. This protection can be in form of military assistance or financial aid, 
depending on the form of hierarchy—security or economic. The subordinate state knows that 
the dominant state will come to the rescue in the event of any situation requiring assistance. 
Hence, the subordinate state does not fully bear or carry the consequence of its decisions on 
its own; the dominant state carries a part of the costs and consequences. This means that the 
subordinate state lacks the incentives to avoid risky actions, as it is partially protected from 
the consequences of a bad or unwanted outcome.  This behavior is known as moral hazard. 
Given the protection the subordinate state receives from the dominant state, it has an incentive 
to alter its behavior leaning towards risky decisions. This is applicable to economic, 
diplomatic, and security matters.  The subordinate state can engage in risky trade deals, under 
the belief that that the dominant state will carry a large share of the costs if the deal shatters. It 
can also afford to be less diplomatic and more impulsive when it comes to security measures 
and international diplomacy.  
 
H7: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
have a low degree of risk-aversion.   
Operationalization: Here I look for provocative gestures or speeches from the heads 
subordinate state.  
 
Subordination and Relations with Other Subordinates  
It is a logical expectation to assume that subordinates of the same dominant have good 
relations with each other. This is particularly relevant when it comes to trade openness. A 
country would rather have a reliable and trustworthy trading partner. Reliability and 
trustworthiness can be measured as a result of previous interactions and the stemming 
reputation. It can also be a function of characteristics that ensures reliability. Here, hierarchy 
would play a role, suggesting that subordinates to the same dominant share the same 
characteristics and share the same degree of protection or insurance from the dominant. As I 
have already illustrated in H5 and H6, being a subordinate of a liberal dominant state that 
respects property rights and has a good reputation will incentivize investments and trade in 
the subordinate state. Following this train of thought, one could assume that subordinates of 
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the same dominant state view each other as low-risk trade partners and investment havens. 
This is due to the fact that subordinating to the same dominant leads to similar, if not 
equivalent, political orders that include protection of property rights, low risks of sovereign 
theft etc. Subordinates to the same dominant state will not only have better economic 
relations, but also better diplomatic relations. This occurs because they view each other as 
allies and partners that follow the same leader and, thus, the same rules.  
 
H8: Subordinate states of the same dominant are more likely to have good economic 
and diplomatic relations with one another.  
Operationalization: This can be measured using trade and political cooperation. However, 
measuring trade with all subordinates to the same dominant is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For this reason, I will measure good relations with the absence of conflicts and tensions 
between the subordinates, suggesting I will investigate whether the countries have formal 
diplomatic relations with one another or not. This indicator may not capture 100% of the 
phenomenon, however testing the validity of this hypothesis can be done in a future research.  
 
Subordination and Public Opinion  
People differ in their policy preferences—and so do societies and nations. Those that share 
the same values, norms, and political ideologies are more likely to share the same preferences 
regarding international order and, ergo, the nature of the relationship between nations. A 
democratic country that has almost the same preference as the dominant state will submit to 
the dominant state, if the benefits of subordinating exceed the loss of sovereignty. That is due 
to the fact that in a democratic country the state’s preferences are representative of the 
public’s preferences. Ergo, a hierarchal international relationship that is utility maximizing for 
the subordinate state is also utility maximizing for its population. A democratic subordinate 
nation that has the same or similar preferences as the dominant state is more likely to view the 
dominant state in a positive manner.  
 
H9: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely a democratic subordinate 
state will view the dominant state positively.   
Operationalization: I will measure this hypothesis using public opinion polls assessing the 
sentiment in the subordinate state towards its dominant.  
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Nevertheless, a subordinate state that has an authoritarian political system implies that the 
preferences of the government are not necessarily coherent with that of the population. Thus, 
if a government decides that a hierarchal relationship with a dominant state will be beneficial, 
the public may not necessarily have the same opinion. This means that the preferences of the 
political elite are not equivalent with the preferences of the population. This can be 
problematic on two levels: the domestic level and the international level. From a domestic 
perspective, having an authoritarian government will lead to instability as the population does 
not feel represented. From an international perspective, having an authoritarian government 
may seem irrelevant. However, a government that engages in an international social 
hierarchal contract without the mandate of the population is challenging in many ways. First 
of all, from a democratic perspective, an authoritarian government does not have legitimacy 
or authority to represent a nation in the international community. Second of all, subordinating 
to a foreign state without a mandate from the people may lead to sentiments hostile to the 
dominant state. That is because the people lost a degree of their sovereignty as a nation 
without prior approval or consent.  
 
H10: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the population of an 
authoritarian subordinate state will develop sentiments hostile to its dominant.  
Operationalization: I measure this hypothesis using public opinion polls assessing the 














4.  Empirical Analysis  
4.1 The Dominant State: The United States of America  
 
Scholars agree that we live in a unipolar international order where the US is the hegemon.32 
The US is well advanced in terms of military and economic capabilities. The US dollar is the 
de facto world currency.33 Since the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1971, most 
currencies around the world are no longer pegged to the US dollar. Nevertheless, the US has 
the largest economy in the world and therefore most international transactions are conducted 
with the US dollar. According to Robert Gilpin between 40 and 60 percent of all international 
financial transactions are conducted with the US dollar.34 The United States ranks as number 
one in the Global Fire Power Index, measuring nations’ military capabilities and available 
firepower worldwide.35 The US spends relatively a lot of resources and money for military 
purposes. The US defense expenditures were 3.27% of its GDP in 2015 that is clearly higher 
than the worldwide average of 2.28%.36 
Nevertheless, the US does not only have material resources to be a dominant state, the US 
also enjoys international prestige and acknowledgement from the international community. 
For instance, it is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council that have 
the power of veto. Hence, the presence and influence of the US dominates world politics and 
cannot be ignored or disregarded. For this reason, I will use the US as the dominant state in 
my thesis.  
 
4.2 The Subordinate States: Japan, Ecuador, and Bahrain 
 
Lake’s findings suggest that states subordinate to the US spend less on defense as a share of 
the GDP, are more economically open, and are more likely to follow the US into international 
conflicts. Lake’s findings imply that security hierarchy is negative and statistically significant 
in respect to the defense efforts of the subordinate state. Thus, countries that are subordinate 
to the US on the security level spend proportionally less of the GDP on defense. Based on 
																																																								
32 Donnelly 2006; Nexon and Wright 2007. 
33 A world currency refers to a currency that is used in international transactions.  
34 Gilpin 2001. 
35 Global Fire Power 2016.  
36 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2016: 32; World Bank 2016.  
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Lake’s regression analysis, an average country spends ca. 2.57% of its GDP on defense each 
year. A marginal increase in security hierarchy reduces defense efforts by 1.1% of the GDP.37  
Security hierarchy is, however, positively and significantly related to trade openness in the 
subordinate state. The average amount of trade as a percentage of the GDP is 64.07%. A 
marginal increase ceteris paribus in security hierarchy leads to 3.8% increase in a country’s 
trade as a percentage of the GDP.38 Nevertheless, Lake discovered that economic hierarchy is 
never statistically significant to influence the defense efforts or trade openness of the 
subordinate state. Lake discovers that countries that are in both economic and security 
hierarchy do show positive and statistically significant effects on trade.39 Also, being in a US 
security and economic hierarchy is closely related to the likelihood of joining a US-led 
military coalition.40 
The astonishing finding is that, according to Lake’s model, economic hierarchy is not related 
to trade openness. I argue that this might be due to the indicators that Lake measures 
economic hierarchy with. I argue that by using the indicators Lake developed and adding 
foreign aid as a third indicator, one could detect more efficiently whether a country is an 
economic hierarchy and consequently successfully account for its influence.  
Lake restricted his analysis to the three effects on the subordinate state: trade openness, 
defense efforts, and joining US-led wars. His conclusion that economic hierarchy alone is 
insignificant may be due to the fact that he analyzed behavioral change only in regards to 
defense efforts, trade openness, and joining US-led wars. I argue that by using various levels 
of the effect on the subordinate state, one could reach useful findings. Therefore, I developed 
ten theoretical expectations, which makes it more likely to capture empirical effects and 
evidence. I use Japan, Ecuador and Bahrain to empirically test the theoretical expectations. 
Analyzing hierarchy in a qualitative manner can offer more in-depth explanatory factors. To 
find out the effects the different types of hierarchy have on the subordinate state, I chose a 
state that is in a security hierarchy with the US (Japan), another one that is in an economic 
hierarchy (Ecuador), and a third one that is in both (Bahrain). It is interesting to see if, in fact, 
Lake’s findings are applicable on a qualitative analysis or a case study. I chose my case 
studies based on the fulfillment of the different indicators of international hierarchy (the 
independent variable). I tried as much as possible to select a state that fulfilled all the 
																																																								
37 Lake 2007: 73-74. 
38 Lake 2009: 155-156. 
39 Ibid 157. 
40 Ibid 169. 
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indicators in both hierarchies. The period investigated is from 1990 until 2010. The end of the 
Cold War represents a new unipolar world order, where the US is considered the winner of 
the war and, therefore, a world leader with a successful political system. I will end the 
investigation period at 2014 due to data and statistics restrictions. 
 
4.2.1 Subordinate State in a Security Hierarchy: Japan  
 
Independent Variable: Why is Japan in a security hierarchy with the US?  
 
US Military Deployments in Japan 
First of all, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US grants 
the US the right to have military bases on Japanese territory in exchange for a US pledge to 
defend Japan in the event of an attack. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) serves 
under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and collects data for the Department of Defense 
(DoD). The DMDC releases a quarterly report on “Active Duty Military Personnel by 
Region”41. In this report the number and location of overseas military personnel is given.42 In 
1990, there were a total of 46.593 military personnel in Japan. 43 In 2014, the US military 
deployment reached a total of 54.179.44 This implies a growing hierarchal relationship.  
 
Independent Allies 
The US has formal diplomatic relations with all states except 5: Bhutan, North Korea, Iran, 
Syria, and Taiwan.45 Nevertheless, the diplomatic relations between Japan and the former 
countries exist. Japan has embassies in all of these countries, which implies a formal 
diplomatic relation and, thus, either a degree of alliance or a potential for alliance. I am aware 
that the relations may only be formal and not real alliances. However, the fact that Japan has 
diplomatic relations with countries that are not US allies weakens the hierarchal relationship. I 
argue that Japan, nevertheless, is a good choice for my case study because US military 
deployment on Japanese territory outweighs the independent allies.  
																																																								
41 DMDC 1990; DMDC 2014. 
42 I do not differentiate between Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force personnel. I only look at the total number of 
military personnel.  
43 The then-US military presence in Japan made up almost 40% of all US military deployments in East and 
Pacific Asia. 
44 This makes up approximately 95% off all US military deployments in East and Pacific Asia. 
45 I consider formal diplomatic relations as the presence of an embassy. 
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Dependent Variable: How does the security hierarchy with the US influence Japan?  
 
Subordination and Perception of Security  
H1: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the less effort the subordinate state will 
invest in defense. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military 
defense efforts of Japan make up 1% of its GDP.46 As the world average expenditure is 2.28% 
of the GDP, Japan spends clearly less than 50% of what the average state does. This implies 
that Japan relies on the US for protection, rather than relying on self-help.  
 
H2: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the dominant state will aid 
the subordinate state in an international conflict. 
Here, I define international conflict as any event of international disagreement between 
nations that involves threatening or harming resources, autonomy, or citizens of a foreign 
country. I use the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset collected by the Correlates of 
War Project that records all instances when one state threatened, displayed, or used force 
against another state. Since 1993, Japan was involved in 28 international disputes or conflicts, 
most of them with Russia, China, or North Korea—who are not subordinates of the US and 
may even be considered as US-rivals. China is a permanent Security Council member (which 
I argue precludes the potential of it being a subordinate to any state) and North Korea does 
not have any diplomatic relations with the US. The majority of the conflicts were minor and 
ended after a few days. The US was only involved in the conflict with North Korea; it was, 
however, involved from the start of the conflict. Therefore, one cannot conclude that it joined 
the conflict to protect its subordinate. I cannot dismiss the hypothesis that the US will aid its 
subordinates in case of international conflict just on the premise that the US did not aid Japan 
in any international conflict. A possible explanation can be the lack or absence of serious and 
major conflicts involving Japan. Japan was not involved in any international conflict that 






46 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2015. 
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Subordination and Compliance  
H3: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
comply with the dominant state.   
I look at UN Security Council resolution drafts to determine whether Japan’s voting behavior 
was influenced by the vote of the US. I aim to investigate whether being a subordinate to the 
US incentivizes the subordinate state to comply with the US, inter alia, follow the same 
voting pattern in international organizations. Japan was a non-permanent member in the 
Security Council in the years of 1992-1993, 1997-1998, 2005-2006, and 2009-2010. Due to 
the scope of this thesis, I will only be able to analyze resolution drafts vetoed by the US in 
order to account for the voting behavior of the subordinate state given the vote of the US. 
During the years that Japan served in the UN Security Council, the US has only vetoed four 
resolutions. Japan voted in favor of three of these resolutions and abstained to vote in one.4748 
So according to my measurement, subordinates in a security hierarchy do not necessarily 
comply with the dominant state in international organization voting.  
 
H4: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
join international conflicts that the dominant state is involved it.  
The US was involved in more than 42 MIDs between 1993 and 2010.49 Japan did not join any 
of these conflicts, except two. First is the invasion of Iraq aka Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003 that was led by the US. Japan joined the coalition forces in 2004, but did not aid in 
combat. All the Japanese soldiers stationed in Iraq were under the Japanese Reconstruction 
and Support Group, which only had humanitarian purposes.  
In the years 1993 until 1996, disputes between North Korea, US, and South Korea led to 
tension in the region. Japan was the subject of North Korean threats in 1995, which led it to 
join a joint naval exercise with the USA, South Korea, Australia, and Canada forces.50 The 
empirical phenomena are not sufficient to determine whether the hypothesis can be fully 
rejected or not. The two cases where Japan joined an international conflict that the US was 
involved in make up ca. 0.05% of all international conflicts that the US was involved in. 
Nevertheless, this may be due to the insignificancy or triviality of the conflicts that the US 
																																																								
47 All of the 4 draft-resolutions were about the occupied Arab territories.  
48 United Nations Security Council 1997; United Nations Security Council 2006. 
49 Palmer et al. 2015. 
50 Ibid. 
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was involved in, suggesting that the conflict was not significant enough to require external 
assistance.  
 
Subordination and Economic Openness  
H5: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely trade will constitute a high 
share of the GDP of the subordinate state.   
According to World Bank National Accounts data files, trade constitutes ca. 39% of the 
Japanese GDP. The share of trade/GDP has been growing since 1990.51 This cannot be 
interpreted as a result of international hierarchy due to external factors like globalization. 
Nevertheless, the average trade/GDP worldwide is almost 59%.52 This contradicts Lake’s 
findings that security hierarchy positively influences the trade in the subordinate state. Japan’s 
trade constitutes a low share of the GDP in comparison to the median country worldwide.   
 
H6: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely foreign investments will be 
made in the subordinate state.   
I use the net foreign direct investment in current US dollars to measure the magnitude of 
foreign investments in Japan. The net FDI in Japan has been growing since 1990, reaching an 
all time high in 2013 ($139.79 billion). In 2014, Japan has received more than $110 billion in 
FDI.53 Japan is the second largest recipient of FDI after the US, suggesting that being in a 
hierarchal relationship with the US does, in fact, increase the FDI in the subordinate state.  
 
Subordination and Risk Aversion  
H7: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
have a low degree of risk-aversion.   
According to BBC’s Rupert Wingfield-Hays, Japan and China made an unwritten agreement 
in 1970 that Japanese leaders would not visit the Yasukuni shrine because China and South 
Korea view it as a symbol of Japanese aggression during World War II.  In 2013, Shinzo Abe, 
the Japanese prime minister, visited the shrine. He argues it was an anti-war gesture, however, 
China and South Korea interpreted the move as a provocative act.54 There are tensions and 
disputes between Japan, the People’s Republic of China (China), and the Republic of China 
																																																								
51 World Bank 2016. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 BBC News 2013. 
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(Taiwan) over territory in the East China Sea. Japan has control over the islands; however, 
China claims discovery and ownership of the islands. In 2014, Japan’s national broadcaster 
reported that the Japanese education ministry made plans to incorporate Japan’s claim of the 
islands into the teaching material for the nation’s high schools.  
 
Subordination and Relations with Other Subordinates  
H8: Subordinate states of the same dominant are more likely to have good diplomatic 
relations with one another.  
I will test this hypothesis by looking at the countries that are in conflict with Japan and 
determining whether said countries are subordinates to the US or not. Japan is only in conflict 
or dispute with a few countries: North Korea, China, Russia, and Taiwan. Japan and Russia 
are in conflict over Russia’s control of the Southern Kuril Islands. Japan, South Korea, North 
Korea, and China are in dispute over Japan’s military occupations in the 20th century, despite 
formal statements of regret from Japanese prime ministers. There are strong anti-Japanese 
sentiments in China, North Korea, and South Korea. Japan also has strained relations with 
China and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands.  
So the question is: Are the countries, which Japan is in conflict with, subordinates to the US?  
I argue that China is not subordinate to the US. China’s economy has successfully overtaken 
that of the US (in terms of GDP) and is the largest foreign creditor to the US holding about 
10% of the national debt. 55 North Korea is a clear enemy of the US. This hostility has 
developed during the Korean War, but is also defined by North Korea’s nuclear weapons test 
and its ongoing threats towards the US. Furthermore, the two states have no formal 
relationship with one another. The US and Taiwan do not have formal diplomatic relations, 
suggesting Taiwan cannot be a subordinate to the US. The US has military deployments in 
South Korea and there is military co-operation between Seoul and Washington. I cannot 
determine without further investigation that South Korea is in fact a subordinate state to the 
US, but it definitely is an ally. In short, most of the countries in conflict with Japan are also in 






55 Kruger 2013. 
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Subordination and Public Opinion  
Here, I test either hypothesis 9 or 10 based on the political regime of Japan. I use the 
Economist’s Democracy index and the Freedom House index to determine whether Japan is a 
free democracy or an authoritarian regime and, based on my conclusion, I will test either 
hypothesis 9 or 10.  
The Democracy index measures the degree of democracy in a country using five indicators: 
electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture. The Freedom House index measures freedom, using 
indicators like democracy, political freedom, and human rights. Japan was ranked, in 2014 in 
the democracy index, as the 20th democratic country in the world with a score of 8.08/10, 
making it a full democracy. Furthermore, according to the Freedom House index, Japan is a 
free country. Thus, I will test hypothesis 9, which investigates the effects of hierarchy on a 
democratic state, using public opinion polls.   
H9: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely a democratic subordinate 
state will view the dominant state positively 
In the US-Global Leadership Project—conducted in 2013 by the Meridian International 
Center and Gallup—people all over the world were asked if they approve or disapprove of the 
job performance of the global leadership of the US. Fifty-two percent of Japanese people 
approve of the US job performance, 22% disapprove. The approval of US leadership approval 
has been growing in Japan from 24% in 2007 to 52% in 2013, with Japan ranking as the 8th 
country with the highest approval rating of the US.56 Another public opinion poll conducted 
by the Pew Research Center shows that Japanese US favorability has been declining from 
77% in 2007 to 50% in 2008 and increasing again from 2007 to 72% in 2012. Although the 
US favorability rate has been declining, it has never reached less than 50%, suggesting that at 








56 Gallup 2013: 10. 
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4.2.2 Subordinate State in an Economic Hierarchy: Ecuador  
 
Independent Variable: Why is Ecuador in an economic hierarchy with the US?  
 
Monetary Policy  
After the Ecuadorian banking crisis of 1999, the US dollar became legal tender in the 
Republic of Ecuador. Ecuador does not issue any banknotes; it only issues its own Ecuadorian 
cent coins “centavo coins”. It completely relies on US banknotes issues for money supply, 
implying that the Ecuadorian monetary policy is directly linked to the US monetary policy. 
Thus, if the Federal Reserve (Fed) issues more or less money, this will directly influence the 
Ecuadorian monetary market. In short, the Central Bank of Ecuador only issues the centavo 
coins relying completely on the US for money supply.  
 
Trade Dependency  
In 2014, Ecuador exported $27.4 billion and also imported the same amount. Forty percent 
($11.1 billion) of the amount exported was destined to the US and ca. 26% ($7.56 billion) of 
the amount imported came from the US. Ecuador does not trade with any trading partner in 
this magnitude, suggesting that the US is Ecuador’s largest trading partner.57 
 
US Foreign Aid  
According to the World Bank, Ecuador has received more than $160 million in official 
development assistance and official aid.58 The amount of ODA has marginally risen since 
1990 from almost $159 million to $160 million. The US has given more than $26 million to 
Ecuador in foreign aid in 2014.59 This makes up almost 16% of all the foreign assistance 









57 Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) 2014. 
58 World Bank 2016. 
59 USAID 2016. 
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Dependent Variable: How does the economic hierarchy with the US influence Ecuador?  
 
Subordination and Perception of Security  
H1: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the less effort the subordinate state will 
invest in defense. 
The military expenditure in Ecuador has been rising from 1.9% in 1990 to 2.9% in 2014. 
Ecuadorian military expenditure is higher than the worldwide average military expenditure 
relative to GDP (2.2%). This result shows that economic hierarchy does not lead the 
subordinate state to invest less in defense.60 
 
H2: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the dominant state will aid 
the subordinate state in international conflict.  
Since 1990, Ecuador was involved in 9 MIDs mostly with Peru, Colombia, and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The US did not intervene in any conflict, 
implying no hierarchal relationship.61 
 
Subordination and Compliance  
H3: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
comply with the dominant state.   
In 2009, Raphael Correa—then Ecuadorian president—chose not to renew an agreement with 
the US regarding US military forces in the city of Ecuadorian city of Manta. Ecuador-US 
relations reached an all-time low in 2012 after Ecuador offered Julian Assange—Wikileaks 
founder and NSA whistleblower—asylum in its embassy in London, even though he has been 
wanted by the US. This was a clear act of rebellion toward the US. During the time Ecuador 
was a non-permanent member state in the UN Security Council, the US has not vetoed any 
resolutions in the Security Council, therefore, I was unable to analyze the compliance of 
Ecuador. However, from the data collected, it is obvious that Ecuador does not even attempt 
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H4: The higher the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
join international conflicts that the dominant state is involved it.  
Ecuador has not joined any US-led coalition in any international conflict between 1990 and 
2014.  
 
Subordination and Economic Openness  
H5: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely trade will constitute a high 
share of the GDP of the subordinate state.   
Trade makes up 59% of the Ecuadorian GDP.62 This is identical to the average trade/GDP 
worldwide. Thus, the economic hierarchy with the US does not significantly influence trade 
in the subordinate state.  
 
 H6: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely foreign investments will be 
made in the subordinate state.   
The net FDI in Ecuador is negative (ca. -774 million), suggesting that divestment is greater 
than investment in the country. This is an indicator that foreign investors and companies view 
Ecuador as a high-risk country to invest in, despite it being in an economic hierarchy with the 
US.  
 
Subordination and Risk Aversion  
H7: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
have a low degree of risk-aversion.   
Peru and Ecuador fought several armed conflicts over territorial disputes. The last one was in 
1995 and is known by the Cenepa War. The US, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil paved the way 
for diplomatic conversation between Peru and Ecuador that led to the Brasilia Presidential Act 
in October 1998. Furthermore, Ecuador has not initiated any provocative act, gesture, or 
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Subordination and Relations with Other Subordinates  
H8: Subordinate states of the same dominant are more likely to have good diplomatic 
relations with one another.  
The relations between Ecuador and Colombia were under pressure after the Ecuadorian 
President Rafael Correa withdrew the Ecuadorian ambassador in Bogota, Colombia—close 
US ally and potential future NATO member—after a Colombian raid against leftist rebels in 
Ecuador took place.64 Furthermore, a territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador led to the 
Cenepa War in 1995. Since then the border dispute with Peru has been a focus of Ecuadorian 
foreign policy. Colombia is a close ally of the US, which negates the expectation that 
subordinates (or allies) have better relations with one another.  
 
Subordination and Public Opinion  
Ecuador is ranked in the Democracy index as a hybrid regime—the second worst category of 
democracy; and it was ranked in the Freedom House index as partly free. As the dichotomous 
distinction between democracy and non-democracy is ambivalent, I will look at the five 
categories, by which the Democracy index is classified and try to determine whether the 
democratic characteristics exceed the non-democratic ones or not. As the most important 
indicator “electoral process and pluralism” has a score of 8.25/10, one can assume that the 
electoral process and representation is conducted in a free and democratic way. Although, this 
is a minimalistic definition of democracy, it is a fundamental characteristic. Therefore, I 
assume that Ecuador enjoys a minimalistic degree of democracy and will test H9.  
H9: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely a democratic subordinate 
state will view the dominant state positively. 
The results of the US-Global Leadership Project, conducted by the Meridian international 
Center and Gallup in 2013, show that 39% of Ecuadorians approve of the job performance of 
the leadership of the US, while only 21% disapprove. This number grew from 27% in 2007 to 
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4.2.3 Subordinate State in an Economic and Security Hierarchy: Bahrain  
 
Why is Bahrain in a security and economic hierarchy with the US? 
 
US Military Deployments in Bahrain  
As of December 2014 there are 3.413 US military personnel—mostly Navy—in Bahrain. 
There was an increase in US military personnel since 1990, rising from 682 personnel to more 
than three thousand in 2014.65 The US also assists Bahrain to obtain military equipment and 
training. 66 Consequently, one can assume a growing security hierarchal relationship with the 
US. 
 
Independent Allies  
The US has formal diplomatic relations with all states except five states: Bhutan, North 
Korea, Iran, Syria, and Taiwan. Bahraini-Iranian diplomatic relations do exist but tensions 
prevail and in the last 3 years the ambassadors of the countries have been recalled and 
reinstated a few times. Bahrain and North Korea do not have any diplomatic mission with one 
another. In 2012, Bahrain has withdrawn the Bahraini ambassador from Syria. 67  The 
Kingdom of Bahrain has diplomatic relations with Bhutan and Taiwan. However, as 
previously mentioned, using diplomatic relations as an indicator for independent alliances is 
not completely representative of this phenomenon. One should rather look at trade and 
military co-operations. Therefore, in spite of Bahrain having diplomatic relations with Bhutan 
and Taiwan, I do not view them as allies, simply, because there are not special and bilateral 
cooperation between both states. Ergo, I assume that Bahrain does not have allies that are not 
associated with the US, implying a security hierarchal relationship.  
 
Monetary Policy  






65 DMDC 1990; DMDC 2014. 
66 U.S. Department of State 2015.  
67 Trade Arabia 2012. 
68 Central Bank of Bahrain 2012. 
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Trade Dependency  
The US and Bahrain have a Free Trade Agreement that took effect in 2006, generating 
growing US commercial interest in Bahrain and vise versa. In 2014, Bahrain has exported 
goods and services with more than $13 billion—almost 9% of which were purchased by the 
US. Bahrain also imported $19.7 billion—almost 5% of which from the US.69 The US-trade 
dependency of Bahrain is not as high as that of Ecuador and Japan. However, that is mostly 
due to the great distance between the two countries not due to a low degree of hierarchal 
relationship. 
 
US Foreign Aid  
Bahrain has received more than $11 Million dollar in foreign aid from the US. Most of it 
($10.5 million) was in form of Military Assistance, which reinforces the security hierarchy 
between the states.70 
 
Dependent Variable: How does the security and economic hierarchy with the U.S influence 
Bahrain?  
 
Subordination and Perception of Security  
H1: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the less effort the subordinate state will 
invest in defense. 
According to SIPRI estimates, the military expenditure in Bahrain has been decreasing since 
1990 from 5.3% of the GDP to 4.4% in 2014.71 The decrease may seem marginal, however 
the defense efforts have reached in 2007 an all time low at 3.0% of the GDP. This implies that 
the economic and security hierarchal relationship does in fact decrease the defense efforts of 
the subordinate state. The reason for its increase since 2007 (from 3.0% to 4.4% in 2014) 
must be due to external factors because the GDP in Bahrain had a growth rate of 8.3%, 
suggesting the GDP in 2007 was higher than the previous year.72 So the reason for the high 
military expenditure must be result of factors external to the theoretical model, for instance 
perceived threat or an instable region. This, however, requires further research and 
investigation.  
																																																								
69 OEC 2014.  
70 Inside Gov 2012.  
71 SIPRI 2015.  
72 World Bank 2016. 
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H2: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the dominant state will aid 
the subordinate state in international conflict. 
According to MID data, Bahrain was not involved in any international conflicts between 1990 
and 2014. However, in 2011 a series of demonstrations broke out in Bahrain resulting in 
instability in the country. The Bahraini protests were aimed at achieving political freedom and 
equality for the Bahraini Shia population, but expanded to a call to oust Hamad Bin Isa Al 
Khalifa—King of Bahrain.73 Given US support and advocacy for democracy movements and 
regime change in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya (Arab spring), the handling of the situation in 
Bahrain was a clear act of protection. The US did not call for regime change—as wanted by 
the population—nor did it threaten with sanctions. The model analyzed in this thesis does not 
account for domestic policies, suggesting it does not expect the dominant state to aid the 
subordinate state in domestic affairs or conflicts. Nevertheless, this phenomenon could be 
interesting and insightful to analyze in future research in order to determine whether the 
dominant state aids its subordinates in domestic challenges.  
 
Subordination and Compliance  
H3: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
comply with the dominant state.   
The US did not veto any resolution draft during the time Bahrain was a non-permanent 
member in the U.N. Security Council. However, during that time the US and other states 
proposed a resolution concerning the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. Bahrain has voted in 
favor of the resolution, implying compliance.74 
 
H4: The higher the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
join international conflicts that the dominant state is involved in.  






73 Guardian 2011. 
74 United Nations Security Council 1999. 
75 Bahrain joined the Anti-ISIS coalition in 2015. This is outside of the scope of my thesis as the investigation 
period is from 1990-2014. However, this can be interpreted as aiding the US or joining a regional conflict that 
caused regional instability.  
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Subordination and Economic Openness  
H5: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely trade will constitute a high 
share of the GDP of the subordinate state.   
Trade relative to GDP in Bahrain has been declining since 1990, reaching 115% in 2014. 76 
This decline, however, is not a result of declining trade but of a rising GDP. According to the 
World Integrated Trade Solution, trade in goods has been on the rise since 1990. 77 
Consequently, one can observe a significant positive effect on trade in Bahrain.  
 
H6: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely foreign investments will be 
made in the subordinate state.   
Net FDI was negative since 1990 in Bahrain. It has been decreasing since 1990 from -$207 
million to almost -$1 billion.78 This indicates that people living in Bahrain invest abroad more 
than people abroad invest in Bahrain. Subordinating to the US did not increase the FDI; on 
the contrary, it has a significant negative effect on it.  
 
Subordination and Risk Aversion  
H7: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the subordinate state will 
have a low degree of risk-aversion.   
Bahrain did not initiate any provocative gesture or speech against another state or an 
international institution. Bahrain has remained relatively risk-averse and did not initiate, 
encourage, or provoke any international dispute.79  
 
Subordination and Relations with Other Subordinates  
H8: Subordinate states of the same dominant are more likely to have good diplomatic 
relations with one another.  
Bahrain and Qatar have been, since the beginning of the 20th century, in conflict over 
territorial disputes. Qatar can be considered a subordinate of the US (or US ally) because the 
exchange rate is fixed to US dollar. Bahrain and Israel do not have any diplomatic or 
economic relationship, and Bahrain does not recognize the state of Israel and vise versa.80 
																																																								
76 The Bahraini GDP increased from $4.2 billion in 1990 to $33.8 billion in 2014.  
77 World Integrated Trade Solution 2016. 
78 World Bank 2016. 
79 Other than the domestic instability or the use of force and violence with protesters, Bahrain did not engage in 
any controversial or disputed international affairs.  
80 Ahran 2013. 
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Israel and the US are close allies and the relationship between both countries is built on 
partnership and alliance. This is an implication that being in an international hierarchy with 
the US does not directly lead to good relationships between the subordinate states.  
 
Subordination and Public Opinion  
Bahrain is, according to the Democracy index, an authoritarian regime with an overall score 
of 2.87/10 and has a freedom status of “not free” in the Freedom House index. Therefore, 
only hypothesis 10 will be tested.  
H10: The greater the hierarchal relationship, the more likely the population of an 
authoritarian subordinate state will develop sentiments hostile to its dominant.  
The US-Global Leadership Project, conducted by the Meridian International Center and 
Gallup, shows that only 38% of Bahraini people approve of the US leadership position in the 
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5.  Conclusion: The Significance of Economic and Security 
Hierarchy 
 
According to my case studies and the analysis presented in this thesis, I have reached the 
following conclusions regarding how international hierarchy influences the behavior of the 
subordinate state.  
 
Subordination and Perception of Threat 
1. Being in a security hierarchy reduces the defense efforts of the subordinate state, 
whereas the economic hierarchy does not reduce the defense efforts; in fact, in the 
case of Ecuador it has increased. Being in a security and economic hierarchy reduces 
the defense efforts in the subordinate state.  
2. Subordinating in a security hierarchy does not mean that the dominant state will aid 
the subordinate state in any international conflict. I theoretically expect, however, that 
the dominant state will aid the subordinate in the event of a major international 
conflict. Japan was only involved in minor international conflicts, thus I was not able 
to empirically prove this theoretical expectation. Being in an economic hierarchy does 
not have any correlation with the assistance of the dominant state in case of an 
international conflict. I was also unable to measure the likelihood that the US will 
assist its economic and security subordinate due to the lack of any international 
conflict that Bahrain was involved in.  
 
Subordination and Compliance  
3. My empirical findings suggest that the subordinate states in a security hierarchy do not 
necessarily comply with the dominant state. Nevertheless, this could be due to the 
indicator I measured compliance with. Future research should come up with a 
different way to measure international compliance to account for the true effect. Being 
in an economic hierarchy does not have any correlation with compliance. Being in an 
economic and security hierarchy does however correlate with compliance  
4. Being in a security hierarchy does not necessarily mean that the subordinate state will 
join international conflicts that its dominant is involved in. In the case study I used, 
Japan only joined 0.05% of the conflicts the US was involved in. Being in an 
economic hierarchy does not have any correlation with joining US-led coalitions. 
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Being in an economic and security hierarchy also does not correlate with joining US-
led coalition. 
 
Subordination and Economic Openness 
5. Being in a security hierarchy does not mean that the trade of the subordinate state will 
constitute a high share of its GDP. Being in an economic hierarchy does not have any 
influence on the trade of the subordinate state. Being in both economic and security 
hierarchy does increase trade.  
6. Being in a security hierarchy correlates with receiving more FDI. Being in an 
economic hierarchy does not influence the FDI in the subordinate state. Being in an 
economic and security hierarchy does not increase the FDI.  
 
Subordination and Risk Aversion  
7. Subordination in a security hierarchy may correlate with less risk aversion. Being in a 
security hierarchy does not significantly influence the subordinate state’s risk 
aversion. Being in a security and economic hierarchy does not influence the 
subordinate state’s risk aversion.  
 
Subordination and Relations with Other Subordinates  
8. Being in a security hierarchy with the US makes it more likely that the international 
conflicts, that the subordinate state is involved in, are with non-subordinates.  Being in 
an economic hierarchy or in an economic and security hierarchy does not correlate 
with having good relations with other subordinates to the same dominant.  
 
Subordination and Public Opinion 
9. A democratic security subordinate to the US is more likely to view the US in a 
positive way. An economic subordinate does view the dominant state in a positive 
way, however, not to the same extent as a security subordinate. An authoritarian 
subordinate does view its dominant in a negative manner and develops hostile 
sentiments towards it.  
 
My results show that economic hierarchy is insignificant to influence the behavior of the 
subordinate state. There can be two reasons for the insignificance of economic hierarchy: 
either the indicators of economic hierarchy do not fully empirically measure the phenomenon, 
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or economic hierarchy does not matter enough to influence the behavior of the subordinate 
state. In theory, the later would be revolutionary as it negates the theoretical expectations. 
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